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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Max Ritchie Cooke appeals from the judgment entered upon a jury verdict
finding him guilty of second-degree kidnapping, aggravated battery, and assault.
Cooke challenges the admission of prior threats against the victim and the
prosecutor's reference to those threats. Cooke also appeals from the denial of
post-conviction relief claiming the district court erred in concluding his counsel
was not ineffective for failing to investigate or challenge the victim's competency
to testify at trial.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedinas
The statement of facts and course of Cooke's criminal and post-conviction
proceedings are set forth in the Respondent's Brief, filed October 10, 2008.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.1-10.) On March 11, 2009, Cooke filed a motion to file a
supplemental brief to "discuss the impact" of two opinions, State v. Grist, 147
ldaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185 (2009), and State v. Parmer, 147 ldaho 210, 207 P.3d
186 (Ct. App. 2009), in his claim that certain evidence was improperly admitted.'
(Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief and Statement in Support Thereof
filed March 11, 2009.) The Court of Appeals granted Cooke's motion. (Order to
Vacate Oral Argument and Allow Leave to File Supplemental Briefing filed March
17, 2009.) Cooke filed his supplemental brief on April 21, 2009. (Supplemental
Appellant's Brief (hereinafter "Supplemental Brief').)

' Grist and Parmer were both decided after Cooke filed his opening brief.

The particular facts relevant to the issues raised in Cooke's supplemental
brief are as follows. Prior to trial, the state filed a "Brief in Support of ldaho Rule
404(b) Evidence" in which it advised Cooke and the court of its "view of
anticipated facts at trial, together with ldaho case law on the admissibility of
ldaho Criminal Rule 404(b) misconduct, by the defendant."

(R., pp.13-18.)

Specifically, the state asserted:
The facts will show that in the early morning hours of
January 18, 2003, the defendant drove a pickup truck off of Ustick
Road, through a fence, approximately 80 yards through a field, and
into a tree. His wife, Alison Cooke, was the passenger in the
pickup truck. She was seriously injured when the truck struck the
tree. Ada County Sheriffs [sic] deputies [sic] observations at the
scene were that the driver of the pickup had sufficient time to stop
the truck before it traveled the approximately 80 yards through the
field. They also observed that the tracks in the pasture grass in the
field showed that the truck corrected its course to line up on the
tree prior to striking the tree. Finally, and most important, the
deputies observed that the tracks indicated that the pickup truck
accelerated in the field prior to striking the tree.
After the crash, the defendant was interviewed and gave
various stories, but the central theme was that he left the road
accidentally and apparently hit the gas pedal instead of the brake
pedal prior to striking the tree. He maintains the crash into the tree
was an accident.
The State's evidence would show that the defendant made
several threats to Alison Cooke in the approximately six weeks prior
to the crash. The defendant was suspicious that his wife was
calling or seeing another man. The threats made to Alison were
that he would kill her if he found out that she was talking to another
man or seeing another man. The defendant not only made these
threats directly to Alison Cooke, but he also told other people that
he would kill Alison if he found out that she was speaking to
another man. He also threatened to kill himself.
Due to the trouble in the marriage, Alison Cooke left the
defendant and went to live with her brother in Meridian. . . . During
November and December the defendant threatened that he would
kill her if he found out that she was seeing another man.

Immediately prior to kidnapping Alison, the defendant called
the man that the defendant believed Alison was dating. The
defendant told that man that if the defendant found out that Allison
[sic] was speaking to that man, that the defendant would make
"headline news." The crash took place within a couple of hours of
that telephone call.
The State believes that those statements made by the
defendant are evidence that the defendant's crash into the tree was
not an accident as the defendant claims, but rather show the
defendant's intent and his lack of absence of mistake or accident.
ldaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) together with ldaho case law
permits the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
to prove what the defendant's intent was or to prove his absence of
mistake or accident.
(#34820 R., pp.14-76.)
At the hearing where the parties discussed the threats, the prosecutor
further detailed the nature of the evidence the state intended to offer:
And about November of 2002, particularly about Thanksgiving-time
until the crash, which was the middle of January, so roughly six or
seven weeks, the defendant made a number of statements about
his intention to kill Alison Cooke if she attempted to leave him or if
he found out that she was talking to a fellow on the telephone who
he was suspicious of. That fellow's name is Shane. And he made
those statements to her. And he made the statements to a couple
of her friends and a couple of her relatives, her brother and sister.

On the very night that [the wreck] happened, which was - actually, it occurred early in the morning on Saturday, but it was
Friday night - - the defendant made a call to this Shane, who he
believed was - - or who he believed either was trying to have an
affair with Alison or that Alison was talking to him on the telephone
and said to this Shane on the telephone, "if I find out that Alison has
been talking to you, I'll make headline news." That was within a
couple of hours of the crash, itself.

The prosecutor further noted he was "not positive that those statements
are other crimes or wrongs or misconduct" because "[tlhey seem to be all part
and parcel of the same set of circumstances that led up to the crash but, "[o]n
the other hand, some of the -- some of the statements are separated by as much
as six weeks, some just by a couple of hours." (#34820 Tr., p.8, Ls.3-8.)
Cooke objected to the admission of the statements, claiming admission of
the statements would require proof of the "predicate 'ifs,"' i.e., "if' Cooke ever
found Alison was having an affair, which Cooke contended "would be
unnecessarily belonging of the event here." (#34820 Tr., p.10, Ls.7-17.) Cooke
also argued the statements would be unduly prejudicial. (#34820 Tr., p.10, L.17

- p.1 I , L.3.)
The court noted the admissibility of the prior threats was "committedto [its]
discretion . . . based upon the provisions of 404" and concluded "any threats
made to Alison Cooke are relevant, and . . . their probative value outweighs the
prejudicial effect in this case." (#34820 Tr., p.12, Ls.12-25.) The court also
indicated the state would be required to prove Cooke accelerated prior to hitting
the tree before the court would permit Shane to testify regarding the threat Cooke
communicated to him the evening of the collision. (#34820 Tr., p.15, Ls.21-25.)
At trial, Christine Heavin, Alison's sister, testified she overheard a
telephone conversation between Cooke and Alison in which Cooke "was
screaming . . . that if he found out [Alison] was talking to or seeing Shane, he
would kill both of them." (#34820 Tr., p.114, Ls.22-25.) Christine further testified
that Cooke also called and told her that "he felt that Alison and Shane had been

seeing each other and that if he found out they had been, he would kill Shane"
and that "Alison [would] be sorry for what happens." (#34820 Tr., p.116, L.25 p.117, L.5.)

Stacy Wilson, Cooke's and Alison's neighbor, and Kathy

Bosserman, a friend of Cooke's and Alison's, also both testified they heard
Cooke threaten to kill Alison andlor Shane if he found out they were having a
relationship. (#34820 Tr., p.127, Ls.10-18 (Cooke tells Stacy if he ever caught
Alison "cheating" on him, he would "kill 'em"); p.275, Ls.121-13 (Kathy hears
message from Cooke to Alison telling her he would "kill her" if "he ever caught
her doing anything"); p.275, Ls.1-I I(same).)
Shane and Alison also testified regarding Cooke's threats. Specifically,
Shane testified Cooke threatened his life and that on the night of the wreck,
Cooke called him and said "if he found out [Shane] was even talking to [Alison],
he was going to make headline news." (#34820 Tr., p.297, Ls.15-16.) Cooke
called Shane a second time that same night and again threatened to kill Shane
and told Shane if he found out he "had been with Ali that night that he would kill
[him]." (#34820 Tr., p.298, Ls.19-24.)
Consistent with the testimony of the other witnesses, Alison testified that
Cooke told her "[ilf he found [her] with anybody else, he would hurt [her] to make
sure that [she] wouldn't be with anybody." (#34820 Tr., p.336, Ls.14-15.)

SUPPLEMENTAL ISSUES
Cooke states the supplemental issues on appeal as:
1.

Should this Court adopt either a clear and convincing
evidence standard, or a preponderance of the evidence
standard, to the threshold determination of whether a prior
bad act has been proved by the State for purposes of Rule
404(b)?

2.

Under any standard of proof, was there sufficient evidence
presented to support the admissibility of the prior bad acts
evidence introduced by the State at trial, and did the district
court make the requisite factual findings in support of the
admissibility of this evidence?

(Supplemental Brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the supplemental issues on appeal as:
Should this Court decline to address the standard of proof required to
1.
admit evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) since Cooke's threats do not constitute
404(b) evidence? Alternatively, should this Court reject Cooke's invitation to
adopt a preponderance or clear and convincing evidence standard since the
relevant standard for admissibility is already provided for in I.R.E. 104?
Has Cooke failed to establish the district court erred in admitting evidence
2.
of Cooke's threats?

ARGUMENT
Cooke Has Failed To Establish Error In Relation To The Admission Of His Prior
Threats To Kill Alison And Shane
A.

Introduction
In his Supplemental Brief, Cooke asks this Court to (1) determine the

standard applicable to determining whether evidence is admissible under I.R.E.
404(b); and (2) conclude that under any standard, "the proof presented by the
State [was] insufficient to establish" Cooke made any threats and, consequently,
the district court abused its discretion in admitting the statements. (Supplemental
Brief, pp.5-13.) Because Cooke's prior threats to kill Alison were part and parcel
to the crimes charged, they are not properly characterized as prior bad acts
subject to a Rule 404(b) analysis. Even if the threats are subject to Rule 404(b),
the standards governing admissibility of the statements are set forth in I.R.E.
104. Application of the correct standards to Cooke's statements reveals the
statements were properly admitted. Cooke has failed to establish otherwise.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law reviewed de novo.

State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993)
(citations omitted). However, the abuse of discretion standard applies to the
district court's determination that the probative value of the evidence is not
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. &

C.

Cooke's Prior Threats Do Not Constitute 404(b) Evidence
As an initial matter, this Court should consider whether Cooke's

threatening statements at issue in this appeal are the type of evidence subject to
consideration under I.R.E. 404(b). The state submits they are not.
Rule 404(b), I.R.E., provides, in relevant part:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided
that the prosecution in a criminal case shall file and serve notice
reasonably in advance of trial, . . . , of the general nature of any
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
(Bold in original.)
The ldaho Supreme Court explained the source of Rule 404(b) in

Grist,

stating:
This rule has its source in the common law. The common law rule
was that the doing of a criminal act, not part of the issue, is not
admissible as evidence of the doing of the criminal act charged.
The policy underlying the common law rule was the protection of
the criminal defendant. The prejudicial effect of character evidence
is that it induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to
have committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal
character. Character evidence, therefore, takes the jury away from
their primary consideration of the guilt or innocence of the particular
crime on trial.
Grist,
-

147 ldaho at -,

205 P.3d at 1188 (emphasis added, citations and

quotations omitted).
Thus, evidence is only properly considered "404(b) evidence" if it is
evidence of "criminal character." However, where, as here, the evidence is not
evidence of "criminal character," but is instead statements made by the

defendant that are, as the prosecutor described them, "part and parcel" of the
alleged offenses, the evidence does not fit within the parameters of Rule 404(b).
As explained in State v. Sheldon, 145 ldaho 225, 228, 178 P.3d 28, 31 (2008):
The comments to the 1991 amendments to Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)
state the notice requirement "does not extend to evidence of acts
which are 'intrinsic' to the charged offense." Federal courts in
several jurisdictions have discussed the nature of "intrinsic"
evidence. "Evidence of an act is intrinsic when it and evidence of
the crime charged are inextricably intertwined, or both acts are part
of a single criminal episode, or it was a necessary preliminary to the
crime charged." U.S. v. Sumlin, 489 F.3d 683, 689 (5th Cir. 2007)
(citing United States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369, 374 (5thCir. 2005));
accord U.S. v. Barnes, 49 F.3d 1144, 1149 (6th Cir. 1995); U.S. v.
Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 125 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts before it, the ldaho Supreme
Court concluded Sheldon's "possession of a large amount of cash is not a prior
crime, wrong or other act." Sheldon, 145 ldaho at 228, 178 P.3d at 31. "It is
physical, circumstantial evidence" which the jury could conclude "was part of
Sheldon's alleged criminal activity," trafficking in methamphetamine.

Id-

The

evidence was therefore properly admitted so long as it was relevant and not
unduly prejudicial.
Similarly, Cooke's threats were part and parcel and intrinsic to the crimes
charged. The admissibility of the statements are, therefore, subject only to the
requirements of I.R.E. 401 and 403 and were properly admitted in accordance
with these rules. See, e.q., State v. Nez, 130 ldaho 950, 953-54, 950 P.2d 1289,
1292-93 (Ct. App. 1997) (concluding probation officer's testimony regarding
Nez's conduct on probation was "all part and parcel of the probation violation for
which he was charged" and was, therefore, "relevant and also not evidence of

'bad character' as contemplated by Rule 404(b)"); State v. Flovd, 125 ldaho 651,
653-54, 873 P.2d 905, 907-08 (Ct. App. 1994) (analyzing defendant's statements
regarding sexual encounter with victim under I.R.E. 401 and 403 and concluding
statements were "direct evidence of the rape charge," not "evidence of some
'other crimes, wrongs or acts"'). See also State v. Marlar, 94 ldaho 803, 498
P.2d 1276 (1972) (noting "Prior threats of the accused or evidence of previous
trouble are always relevant to illustrate mental attitude of the accused toward the
prosecuting witness at the time of the assault" and noting "prior threats may
comprise part of the mosaic of the criminal event in that they may tend to
establish an accused's attitude toward the victim or an intent to inflict harm upon
him."). But see State v. Avila, 137 ldaho 410, 413, 49 P.3d 1260, 1264 (Ct. App.
2002) (analyzing statements made during sexual battery under Rule 404(b) and
concluding the statements were not offered for an improper purpose since "Rule
404(b) does not prevent the introduction of other misconduct evidence if the
misconduct was so interconnected with the charged offense that a complete
account of the charged offense could not be given to the jury without disclosure
of the uncharged misconduct"). Because Cooke's threats were part of the same
criminal episode and intrinsic to the crime, I.R.E. 404(b) does not apply to
evidence of those threats. Cooke's argument should be rejected on this basis.
D.

And Even If Cooke's Prior Threats Constitute 404(b) Evidence, Cooke Has
Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Admittinn Them
Even if Cooke's prior threats are subject to Rule 404(b), Cooke's request

that this Court adopt a preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing

evidence standard as a prerequisite to admission should be rejected just as it
was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Huddleston v. United States,
485 U.S. 681 (1988).
In Huddleston, the petitioner asserted that prior to admitting evidence
under Rule 404(b), the trial court must determine the admissibility of evidence
under Rule 104(a) based upon a preponderance of the evidence standard.' 485
U.S. at 687.

The Supreme Court rejected Huddleston's argument as

"inconsistent with the structure of the Rules of Evidence and with the plain
language of Rule 404(b)."

u Specifically, the Court reasoned:

The text [of Rule 404(b)] contains no intimation . . . that any
preliminary showing is necessary before such evidence may be
introduced for a proper purpose. If offered for such a proper
purpose, the evidence is subject only to general strictures limiting
admissibility such as Rules 402 and 403.
Petitioner's reading of Rule 404(b) as mandating a
preliminary finding by the trial court that the act in question
occurred not only superimposes a level of judicial oversight that is
nowhere apparent from the language of that provision, but it is
simply inconsistent with the legislative history behind Rule 404(b).
Id. at 687-88.
The Court in Huddleston, therefore, "conclude[d] that a preliminary finding
by the court that the Government has proved the act by a preponderance of the
evidence is not called for under Rule 104(a)."

Id.at 689.

The Supreme Court

Huddleston initially argued in his briefing that the "Government was required to
prove to the trial court the commission of the similar act by clear and convincing
proof." 485 U.S. at 687 n.5. At oral argument, however, Huddleston "conceded
that such a position [was] untenable in light of [the Court's] decision . . . in
Bourjaily v. United Sfafes, . . ., in which [the Court] concluded that preliminary
factual findings under Rule 104(a) are subject to the preponderance-of-theevidence standard." Id.

further stated, "In determining whether the Government has introduced sufficient
evidence to meet Rule 104(b), the trial court neither weighs credibility nor makes
a finding that the Government has proved the conditional fact by a
preponderance of the evidence."

Id.at 690.

Rather, "[tlhe court simply examines

all the evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could reasonably find
the conditional fact

.

. . by a preponderance of the evidence."

Id. (emphasis

added). Thus, the standard for admissibility of Rule 404(b) does not require the
court to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the prior bad act occurred;
it only requires the court to conclude "the jury could reasonably find," by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the act occurred.
Although Cooke cites cases indicating some states3 have declined to
follow Huddleston (Supplemental Brief, pp.6-7), ldaho courts traditionally refer to
federal courts for guidance regarding the appropriate interpretation of Idaho's
rules where those rules mirror their federal counterparts. See, e.&, Herrerra v.
&,

146 ldaho 674, 201 P.3d 647 (2009) ("Given the virtual identity between

[I.R.C.P. 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5)] and their counterparts in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and the lack of case law in ldaho, it is appropriate for this Court
to turn to federal authority to address the standard of review" (citations and
footnote omitted)); Black v. Ameritel Inns, Inc., 139 ldaho 51 1, 515, 81 P.3d 416,
420 (2003) (referring to federal case law to interpret ldaho Rule Il(a)(l) because
"the federal and ldaho rules are substantially similar"); State v. Parkinson, 128
Cooke also cites an Eighth Circuit case, United States v. Shoffner, 71 F.3d 1429

.

f8th Cir. 1995). which ourDorts
to follow a Dreoonderance of the evidence
,

ow eve;,

standard. ( ~ u ~ ~ l e m e nBrief,
t a l p.6.)
th'e applicable standard cited in
that case traces back to the standard articulated in Huddleston.

ldaho 29, 34, 909 P.2d 647, 652 (Ct. App. 1996) (referring to United States
Supreme Court precedent on the interpretation of I.R.E. 702). Indeed the ldaho
State Bar Evidence Committee itself relied on federal precedent in adopting and
explaining the meaning of I.R.E. 404(b). See Grist, 147 Idaho at -,

205 P.3d

at 1188 (citing M. CLARK,REPORTOF THE IDAHO
STATEBAREVIDENCECOMMITTEE,
C 404, p.4, relying on United States v. Beechum, 282 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1 ~ 7 8 ) , ~
as authority for the requirement that "the trial court must determine whether there
is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact" in determining
its admissibility).
Because Rules 404 and 104, I.R.E., are identical to Federal Rules 404
and 104, there is no basis for adopting a different standard governing the
admissibility of evidence under Idaho's rules than is required for the Federal
Rules. To the extent Parmer can be read as requiring a different standard, this
Court should disavow any such interpretation.
Regardless of the standard applied to Cooke's prior threats, Cooke has
failed to establish the district court erred in admitting the statements.

As

explained in the Respondent's Brief, the statements were offered for a proper
purpose, were relevant, and were not unduly prejudicial. (-

Respondent's

Brief, pp.12-15.) In its proffer, the state indicated some of its witnesses would
testify that Cooke, prior to the crimes at issue, threatened to kill Alison and
Shane. The court could conclude from this proffer that the jury could find, by a
preponderance of the evidence, or even clear and convincing evidence, that

' The state notes the authority relied on in Grist predates the Supreme Court's
decision in Huddleston.
13

Cooke in fact did so. Huddelston, 485 U.S. at 690; see also United States v.
O'Brien, 618 F.2d 1234, 1239 (7'h Cir. 1980) ("Direct testimony of the defendants'
participation in the prior schemes is sufficient to meet the clear and convincing
standard.") Although the court did not "articulate a separate finding that sufficient
the
evidence existiedl to support a reasonable conclusion that the act occ~rred,"~
"court was acting without the benefit of the Grist opinion," much less the Court of
Appeals'

opinion in Parmer.

Parmer, 147 Idaho at -,

207 P.3d at 191.

Nevertheless, the district court made the required findings when it "articulated the
purpose other than propensity, for admission of the evidence."

Specifically,

the court noted the evidence was relevant to show Cooke's intent. (#34820 Tr.,
p.12, Ls.16-22.) The court also expressly concluded the evidence was not
unduly prejudicial. (#34820 Tr., p.13, Ls.5-8.) The court's conclusions in this

The state disagrees with the Court of Appeals' conclusion in Parmer that Grist
requires as much, but acknowledges review of this issue was denied. Contrary
to the conclusion reached in Parmer, Grist does not "disfavor[ ] an implied
acceptance that sufficient evidence exists to establish a prior bad act as fact by
mere virtue of the trial court's determination of the probative value of the
evidence," such that "a trial court must articulate a separate finding that sufficient
evidence exists to support a reasonable conclusion that the act occurred."
207 P.3d at 191. It is unclear why the standard for
Parmer, 147 ldaho at -,
admissibility determinations under I.R.E. 104 should be applied differently where
the evidence is 404(b) evidence, and it does not appear the Court in Parmer
analyzed why such a distinction should exist. "Rule 404(b) is a relevance rule."
137 ldaho at 412, 49 P.3d at 1262. As such, a finding that evidence is
relevant and admissible pursuant to Rule 104 should, like other relevance
determinations, suffice without the district court taking the extra step of making a
"separate finding that sufficient evidence exists to support a reasonable
207 P.3d at 191. A
conclusion that the act occurred." Parmer, 147 Idaho at -,
finding that the evidence is relevant necessarily includes a finding that there is
sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude the act alleged by the
evidence occurred.

w,

regard are sufficient under Grist and under the Court of Appeals' interpretation of
Grist as articulated in Parmer.
-

Cooke has failed to establish otherwise.

Because Cooke's prior threats are not properly characterized as 404(b)
evidence, this Court need not decide what standard applies to the admissibility of
404(b) evidence. Even if this Court determines Cooke's threats do constitute
404(b) evidence, the applicable standard is that set forth in I.R.E. 104 and
Huddleston, and Cooke has failed to establish that standard was not met. Cooke
has, therefore, failed to establish error in relation to the admission of his prior
threats.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Cooke's convictions for
second-degree kidnapping, aggravated battery, and assault and the district
court's order denying post-conviction relief.
DATED this 1 4 ' ~day of July 2009.

V

D pu y Attorney General
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